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Setting the Stage: May 2001
We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces.
Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.
Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.
We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) barred both superpowers from deploying national defenses against long-range ballistic missiles and from building the foundation for such defenses. The treaty was based on the premise of mutual assured destruction, the belief that stability was ensured by each superpower having confidence in its ability to destroy the other, and the likelihood that if either power constructed a strategic defense, the other would build up its offensive nuclear forces to overwhelm it. The superpowers would therefore find themselves in a never-ending offensive-defensive arms race as each tried to assure the credibility of its offensive nuclear force. The treaty did, however, allow both sides to build defenses against short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. The ABM Treaty was negotiated and signed concurrently with the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms (commonly known as SALT I)-the first in what became a series of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control agreements that first capped, and later reduced, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. 3 For this reason, both countries, when adversaries, considered the treaty a "cornerstone of strategic stability. " But with the Cold War over, missile defense advocates, including Joseph, felt that the ABM Treaty's ban on nationwide missile defenses and its restraints on development and testing prevented the United States from developing and deploying defenses against the proliferating threat of ballistic missiles, especially from countries pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities and long-range missiles. Joseph was confident that the United States was on a path to withdraw from the treaty-something that he and other missile defense advocates had been promoting for years. As Bolton later observed, "Whatever else we did, it was absolutely critical to get out of the ABM Treaty unambiguously. Then, whether we succeeded or failed in broader negotiations with Russia, we would be free to pursue a missile defense system to protect Americans from broader threats. " 
National Security Council Decisionmaking Process
The National Security Council (NSC) was unusually swift and effective in reaching and implementing the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The process was tightly controlled by the NSC staff, ensuring that the decision was close-hold, shared with only a small, trusted group of people, and implemented in a short time. It reportedly began with the issuance in mid-February 2001-a mere 3 weeks after President Bush took office-of a National Security Presidential Directive that laid out the administration's conceptual framework for a new approach to deterrence and strategic offensive and defensive forces, including the intent to amend or withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy ballistic missile defenses and to reduce nuclear weapons to the lowest levels possible. 8 The directive was drafted by Joseph in the first few weeks of the administration. Subsequently, a small group of senior officials in the NSC,
Office of the Vice President, Department of Defense, and Department of State met in April to discuss possible modalities of U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, given the President's campaign promise to proceed with deployment of a national missile defense and to conduct the missile defense testing that such a defense would require. Within days of that meeting, the NSC was circulating drafts of a Presidential speech for comment among that select group. Separately, the NSC tasked the Pentagon to review the U.S. nuclear posture to determine the levels to which the Nation could further reduce its strategic nuclear forces. This effort was overseen by Franklin Miller, the NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, and it proceeded on a parallel track with the ABM Treaty withdrawal aspect of the new strategic framework. 10 Historically, this was not the first time that a major national security decision was reached without conducting an extensive, comprehensive NSC-led interagency review of the rationale and consideration of alternative policy options. An iterative interagency process would have led to consideration of the issue at increasingly senior levels of government, leading ultimately to a Presidential decision, with all the ramifications of each option fully explored and conveyed to the President before he made his final decision. 11 In contrast, the process used in this case appears to have begun with the policy decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses already determined and codified from the top down in a Presidential decision directive. An administration backgrounder with a New York Times reporter intimated the fate of the ABM Treaty: "By issuing the directive, the official said, Mr. Bush will not declare his intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the United States and Soviet Union signed in 1972 to prohibit national missile defenses. The review, however, appears intended to lay the foundation for a decision to do so in parallel with nuclear cutbacks. " 12 In essence, the Presidential directive virtually foreclosed opportunity for dissent or reversal-especially from the State Department and its career bureaucracy, which was believed to be invested in the treaty in particular and the arms control process more generally.
With the decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses made and executed from the top down, the only issues for discussion were the details of implementation. Reflecting Secretary Powell's advice to conduct broad diplomatic consultations, the President's NDU speech contained the following commitments: "I've made it clear from the beginning that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends and allies who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction. . . . These will be real consultations. We are not presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions already made. We look forward to hearing their views, the views of our friends, and to take them into account. " Nonetheless, at a joint press conference following their third face-to-face meeting, the two presidents sounded optimistic about being able to fashion a new U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. President Putin stated his belief that the two countries could "reach agreements,"
and Bush declared that both countries saw progress in their "efforts to build a new strategic framework." Yet their remarks revealed that they remained divided on the key issue of what to do about the ABM Treaty, which Bush described as "outdated" and "dangerous. " He repeated his call for the two countries to "move beyond" the accord. Putin, on the other hand, said the treaty was "an important element of stability, " although he again implied that Moscow was open to amending it. 26 Bush framed most of his subsequent statements about the current relevance of the ABM "it would be difficult for me to agree that some terrorists will be able to capture intercontinental missiles and will be able to use them. "
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Secretary Powell, who also traveled to Shanghai, underscored that President Bush had given neither a formal nor an informal notification of U.S. intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, adding, "We are under no constraints with respect to our thinking. " He made clear that the key issue for the Bush administration was ensuring that the ABM Treaty did not limit U.S. missile defense testing. While emphasizing that Bush did not want the U.S. missile defense program to be "constrained artificially" by the treaty, Powell also noted that the administration was "looking at" Russian suggestions that the United States could "probably do more testing" than it thought it could under the treaty. 29 Pre-Shanghai press reports had suggested that at that meeting, Bush would tell Putin the much anticipated level to which the United States would be willing to reduce its strategic offensive forces as part of the envisioned strategic framework and as a way to help win Russian acquiescence to U.S. missile defense plans. Yet in Shanghai, Bush reiterated an earlier pledge to reduce the deployed U.S. strategic arsenal but offered no specific number, explaining that the United States was still "analyzing" its nuclear arsenal. Putin stated in their joint news conference on October 21 that both sides reaffirmed their "mutual intention" to reduce strategic weapons. The task now, Putin commented, was to "develop parameters of such reductions and to design a reliable and verifiable method" for making the cuts. The Bush administration, however, had repeatedly insisted it had no interest in negotiated reductions, voicing a preference for unilateral, but parallel, reductions.
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National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice downplayed the lack of any formal agreement at the Shanghai meeting and appeared to be lowering expectations for the upcoming Bush-Putin meeting in November. At her Shanghai press conference, Rice stated, "We're not looking for any specific breakthrough at any given meeting. " She further remarked that the two sides would be working on U.S.-Russian strategic relations before, during, and after Putin's November visit, which would be split between Washington and Bush's Texas ranch. were unnecessary between countries that were no longer enemies. At the same time, however, the Russian government realized that the Bush administration intended to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and wanted to make sure the exit was choreographed so that it was not an issue in their relationship.
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During 3 days of talks, Bush and Putin failed to reach an agreement that would permit the United States to move forward with its missile defense plans. Despite a growing rapport between the two presidents, and parallel pledges by each of them to cut their deployed strategic nuclear forces by roughly two-thirds, they were unable to narrow their differences over how to reconcile U.S. pursuit of nationwide strategic ballistic missile defenses with the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibited such defenses. The Bush administration made clear that it preferred unilateral or joint withdrawal from the treaty in order to pursue missile defenses unfettered, whereas Russia wanted to preserve the accord or at least keep in place some limits on future strategic missile defenses.
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During a question-and-answer session at a Crawford school, Putin told the audience, "We differ in the ways and means" of addressing future threats. Yet the U.S. side downplayed the differences, contending that the U.S.-Russian relationship could not be undermined by a dispute over a single issue. Bush declared, "Our disagreements will not divide us. " 37 Rice told reporters on November 15 that the missile defense issue was "a smaller element of the U.S.-Russia relationship than it was several months ago" and that it was "not going to have an effect on the relationship as a whole. "
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Although speculation had existed before the summit that Russia might agree to a deal to modify or suspend the ABM Treaty's prohibitions on testing sea-and air-based components of strategic defenses to forestall a possible U.S. withdrawal from the accord, no such agreement was concluded. The presidents, however, pledged to continue their discussions, and Putin sounded confident about the possibility of reaching an agreement: "One can rest assured that whatever final solution is found, it will not threaten . . . the interests of both our countries and of the world. " Miller noted, however, that significant administration efforts to get the U.S. interagency community to agree on a set of further transparency measures and to negotiate them with Russia were ultimately unsuccessful. This was, in part, because Iraq War planning and execution came to dominate the attention of the national security principals in the administration. Nor did the administration ever propose to Russia a follow-on set of nuclear reductions, which Miller believed had been a genuine goal of Bush.
Russia's Reaction to Withdrawal
Little pageantry or protest marked the U.S. move abrogating the ABM Treaty and its prohibition against nationwide missile defenses, despite often fierce debate on the accord within Washington and around the world. Bush issued a short written statement on June 13, 2002, the day the treaty expired, in which he noted that it was "now behind us, " and he reiterated his commitment to deploy missile defenses "as soon as possible" to protect against "growing missile threats. "
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The President's subdued commemoration of the treaty's passing contrasted sharply with his administration's earlier fervent attacks on the accord. The Russian reaction was also muted.
By this time, the United States and Russia had negotiated SORT and signed a joint declaration outlining a new framework for mutual cooperation. Although some tensions remained in the U.S.-Russia relationship, particularly with respect to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, cooperation continued to grow. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty no longer seemed the cataclysmic event some feared. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov noted the event, but stated the "the primary aim now is to minimize the negative consequences of the U.S. withdrawal" and concentrate on offensive reductions. 48 He and other Russian officials believed that Russia had convinced the United States to continue negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive forces, which represented a significant achievement for Russian diplomacy. Furthermore, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov noted that the U.S. missile defense system did not yet exist and, therefore, there was no reason for Russia to retaliate. 49 However, Russia did announce the next day that it would no longer be bound by START II, a move that was largely symbolic, given that START II never entered into force and that it was effectively superseded by SORT.
In the wake of September 11, 2001 , Putin apparently did not want to jeopardize warming relations with Washington by unduly lamenting an action to which the Bush administration was dedicated and that could not be undone. Speaking the day of the U.S. withdrawal, Foreign
Minister Ivanov said that Russia regretted the action but that it was "now a fait accompli" and "it is our task to minimize the adverse consequences. " 
